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A House with a View
Lee County v. Kiesel, 705 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Environmentalists have generally contested private property rights and
sought to restrict the scope of takings jurisprudence. Their goal has been to
uphold government regulation, particularly land-use regulation, to protect
the environment against takings claims.' But by developing a rigid
anti-takings stance in the fight against property-rights advocates,
environmentalists may be missing an opportunity to expand private
property rights in order to protect the environment.
This Case Note examines a state appellate case that could prepare the
way for an expansion of private property rights to protect the environment.
In Lee County v. Kiesel,2 the Florida District Court of Appeals recognized
the property right of a landowner to view a river. The court held that
invasion of that right, even if resulting from activity that occurred solely on
neighboring properties, constituted a physical invasion of the landowner's
property rights. Environmentalists should seek to create a powerful new
tool to protect the environment by expanding this holding to encompass
rights to view wildlife or to enjoy clean water. There are two parts to this
argument: first, an expansion of takings doctrine to include property rights
such as wildlife and clean water, and second, the use of these expanded
1. The attitude of much of the environmental community toward property-rights litigation is
perhaps best exemplified by comments leading up to the Supreme Court's decision in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Environmentalists feared that a decision
in favor of Lucas would invite a tidal wave of takings claims that would roll back environmental
regulations. See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett & Rose Guffeld, Justice Department Division Backs Curbs
on Health, Safety, Environmental Rules. WALL ST. J.. Dec. 23. 1991. at AS H. Jane Lehman.
Court Hears Case on Land Compensation. WASH. POST. Mar. 7. 1992. at E18. The case was also
decried as "the camel's nose under the tent as far as all types of environmental and public health
regulations." James Rowley, Administration Blasted for Stand in Anti-Erosion Case.
ASSOCIATED PREss, Jan. 3, 1992, available in 1992 WL 5279848.
2. 705 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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property rights to narrow the scope of takings challenges to environmental
regulations.
I
The facts of Kiesel are quite simple. The Kiesels had purchased
riverfront property and built a home on the land. The county then built a
bridge that obstructed the Kiesels' view of the river from their property.
Although the bridge did not physically encroach upon their property, the
Kiesels filed suit, alleging that the county had taken their property without
compensation.3 At trial, the plaintiffs' expert witness testified that the
bridge's obstruction of the river view had reduced the property's value by
over $300,000. 4 The trial court found a taking, and the appellate court
affirmed.5
At first, the decision seems mysterious under takings law. The Supreme
Court has held that a per se taking of private property arises from a
government's "permanent physical occupation" of the property.6 The
county, however, never actually occupied any of the Kiesels' property. Yet
the Florida court "reject[ed] the county's argument that there was no
physical taking here." 7
The explanation is that the Florida court was interpreting Florida's
riparian rights, "one of which is the right to an unobstructed view over the
water to the channel. These rights constitute property, which the
government may not take or destroy without paying just compensation to
the owners." 8 Thus, the obstruction "involved an actual physical intrusion
to an appurtenant right of the Kiesels' property ownership." '
II
While an unobstructed view of a river from riparian property might
seem an unusual property right, other courts have recognized similarly
unusual rights. Restricting access to a property by closing nearby streets
may be a taking, even where government actions do not encroach upon the
3. The bridge blocked the view of the river without encroaching upon the Kiesels' property
because it crossed the river at an angle. See id. at 1014.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 1016.
6. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
7. Kiesel, 705 So. 2d at 1015.
8. Id. (citing Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A. Ry. Co., 78 So. 491 (Fla. 1918)).
9. Id. To support this point, the court cited Palm Beach County v. Tessler, 538 So. 2d 846,
849 (Fla. 1989), which held that obstructing a property's right of access constitutes a taking of an
appurtenance to the property and entitles the owner to compensation.
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property.' The classic English case of Keeble v. Hickeringill" provides
another example. In Keeble, the court held that a neighbor's use of
explosives to scare ducks from the plaintiff s pond constituted an actionable
tort, even though the explosives detonated on the neighbor's property. 2
American courts have generally allowed the state and federal
governments to regulate the hunting of wildlife by landowners and others. 3
Nonetheless, the holding of Kiesel could expand to give landowners the
right to see and enjoy the wildlife on their property.'4 Environmentalists
should press to expand the holding of Kiesel, which recognized the right to
an unobstructed view of a river, to include the right to an unobstructed view
of wildlife. Both rights can be important factors when a landowner
purchases property, and may have an impact on the value of the property. 5
Government infringement of the right to view wildlife would, under Kiesel,
constitute a taking through physical invasion of the landowner's property.'6
10. See Garrett v. City of Topeka, 916 P.2d 21, 32-33 (Kan. 1996) (holding that restriction of
access to a property by commercial vehicles through regulation may result in a taking); Teachers
Ins. & Annuity Ass'n v. City of Wichita, 559 P.2d 347, 355-56 (Kan. 1977) (granting takings
claims where the construction of a limited access highway had forced the neighboring commercial
properties to gain access via circuitous side streets). State-owned airports can be liable for taking
landowners' property when low-flying airplanes pass near their homes. Compensation is owed
even if there is no actual entrance of the plane into the airspace above the landowner's property.
See, e.g., Martin v. Port of Seattle, 391 P.2d 540 (Wash. 1964).
11. 88 Eng. Rep. 945 (Q.B. 1706).
12. See id. While the actual holding of the case involved the theory of malicious interference
with trade, see id., at least one American court has interpreted it as establishing the principle that
property owners have "constructive" ownership of the wildlife on their property. See Pierson v.
Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
13. See MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND. THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL
WILDLIFE LAW 36 (3d ed. 1997).
14. While American law has traditionally held that ownership of animals is not established
until they are subdued or killed, it has also held that wildlife captured by a trespasser on private
property becomes the property of the landowner. See DAVID S. FAvRE & MURRAY LORING,
ANIMAL LAW 22-23 (1983); see also Thomas A. Lund, Early American lVildlife Law, 51 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 703, 713-14 (1976) (noting that under 19th-century law, landowners could exclude
hunters from their land by posting the borders of their property).
15. Some landowners arrange to protect their property from development after their
ownership terminates (usually due to death). These arrangements indicate that one factor in the
original purchase of the property might have been a desire to protect and observe wildlife. See.
e.g., Catherine Lazaroff, Georgia Gem, AUDUBON, Mar. 1, 1998. at 147. 147 (reporting a
landowner's donation of a conservation easement that "prohibits any use of the land that would
detract from its value as a wildlife habitat").
16. Landowners have successfully obtained an injunction against government actions that
harmed fishing and other recreational resources in an estuary where those resources made
property bordering the estuary more valuable. See Taylor Bay Protective Ass'n v. Ruckleshaus,
687 F. Supp. 1319, 1325-27 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (holding that government operation of a flood-
control project constituted a public and private nuisance where it harmed water quality and
aquatic wildlife), aff'd sub non Taylor Bay Protective Ass'n v. EPA. 884 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir.
1989). While nuisance actions and takings actions are different, there is a strong parallel between
the two claims. A takings claim depends on whether the government has infringed upon a
property right; similarly, a nuisance claim depends on whether a neighbor has interfered with a
property right. (A third major claim, trespass, is usually defined as a neighbor's interference with
a property right through direct physical invasion or occupation.) Thus. American courts have
rejected takings claims by analogizing to nuisance law. See City of Wichita v. McDonald's Corp.,
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For example, a landowner may enjoy observing a bird population on his
property. If the government drains a wetland on neighboring property that
provides critical habitat for that bird population, the property owner could
then sue the government for compensation. By destroying the wildlife that
the property owner viewed on his property, the government has physically
invaded a part of his property, and owes compensation.
Using Kiesel to expand property rights could have consequences
beyond the confines of takings jurisprudence. Landowners should enforce
their property right to view wildlife against neighbors who destroy wildlife
resources that the claimants view and enjoy on their own property. 7 For
example, the neighbor might drain wetlands essential to the survival of
birds that roost on the plaintiff's property. Under the principle of Kiesel, the
plaintiff landowner would sue his neighbor for trespass. 8 The court in
Kiesel held that construction of the bridge constituted a physical invasion
that required compensation by the government; the analogous cause of
action when a private actor physically invades another private party's
property is trespass. The landowner could seek either an injunction or
compensation. "
971 P.2d 1189, 1198 (Kan. 1999) (relying on common-law nuisance principles to reject a takings
claim based on a highway overpass blocking the public's view of a commercial building).
Reciprocally, courts have found that when a government action constitutes a nuisance, it may
result in a taking. See Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 376 P.2d 100, 105-07 (Or. 1962) (holding
that overflights by airplanes to a municipal airport may constitute a sufficient nuisance such that
the airport owes compensation, even if the overflights are not directly in the property's airspace);
2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.05[51 (Julius L. Sackman ed.. 3d ed. 1999).
17. Several cases have held that damages to wildlife resources due to landowner actions caii
result in an actionable nuisance. See, e.g.. Colorado Div. of Wildlife v. Cox, 843 P.2d 662. 664
(Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the introduction of non-native wildlife may constitute a public
nuisance because of the threat to native wildlife); Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244. 1248 (R.I.
1982) (holding that a toxic waste spill is a nuisance because of the threat to wildlife and humans).
Picillo held that the plaintiffs had established both a public and a private nuisance for damage to
wildlife resources. See Picillo, 443 A.2d at 1247-48. In finding a private nuisance, the court thus
established that property owners have a property right to wildlife, which has been infringed by the
party committing the nuisance.
18. Although the cases discussed supra note 17. involve nuisance claims, they can equally
support a trespass claim under the theory of Kiesel. A direct, physical invasion of a property right
constitutes trespass, while an invasion of the property right by "indirect and intangible
interferences" constitutes a nuisance. See Thomas W. Merrill. Trespass. Nuisance. (aid the Co,t.
of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 14 (1985). Thus, if the courts establish
that a property right exists in the context of nuisance law, that property right should be equally
protected against physical invasions such as those established in Kiesel. As Merrill notes. and a
sampling of cases reveals, the border between trespass and nuisance is very difficult to draw. For
instance, deposition of sooty particulate matter on a property will constitute a trespass, while odor
on the property (caused by deposition of particles that are simply too small to see) will he
considered a nuisance. Compare Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1979)
(holding that particulate matter could constitute a trespass). with Born v. Exxon Corp.. 388 So. 2d
933 (Ala. 1980) (holding that an odor did not constitute trespass). In fact, this Case Note's
argument creates a legal fiction of "physical invasion" of certain environmental goods (such as
wildlife or clean water), which also blurs the distinction between trespass and nuisance.
19. See 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 110 (1991).
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Environmental plaintiffs should extend these arguments to other
environmental resources. Landowners could argue that Kiesel implies that
riparian landowners have the right to view and to use not just any river, but
a clean, free-flowing, and unspoiled river. The diminution in property value
because of the obstruction of their river view established the Kiesels'
takings claim. It is entirely possible, however, that an equal diminution in
value of their property would have occurred if the river had instead been
turned into an open sewer by the government, ruining its scenic value. Both
harms should be compensated. 20 Such a property right, protected by takings
and trespass law against physical invasion, could discourage further
intrusions by thirsty western cities on the riparian rights of rural landowners
by requiring compensation for the damage to the rivers.2
Environmental advocacy groups following this strategy should look for
a test case with facts such as these: A nonprofit conservation organization
owns and maintains a preserve specifically for the protection and
observation of a species of wildlife. A state government is attempting to
construct a highway through the feeding grounds of a rare bird species that
roosts nearby, on the conservation organization's refuge. Destruction of the
feeding grounds would eliminate the rare bird species from the area, and
thus eliminate the refuge's usefulness to its owner. The organization could
file a takings claim alleging a direct physical invasion of its property rights
to observe, enjoy, and protect the animal species. As in Kiesel, even though
the government never actually physically invades the refuge, the destruction
of an important environmental appurtenance of the property would
constitute a physical invasion,2 and thus a per se taking.'
If the defendant in the test case were a neighboring landowner instead
of the government, then the action would be for trespass.24 Trespass
requires that the defendant intended to occupy, and did physically occupy,
the property right in question.2 Intent in this type of case should attach,
20. There is authority in nuisance law that landowners have a right to clean water. See, e.g.,
Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 272-74 (Utah 1982) (holding a company liable
for contamination of groundwater resources).
21. See generally MARC REaSNER. CADILLAC DESERT (rev. 1993) (describing the history of
water diversions and dam construction in the American West).
22. The closer geographically the harmful government action is to the plaintiff's property, the
greater the chances for success, because the direct impact would be more obvious. In Kiesel, the
bridge seems to have been very close to the plaintiffs property. See Kiesel. 705 So. 2d at 1014.
23. Physical invasion constitutes a per se taking, with no requirement for a total diminution of
value or a balancing of the public and private benefits from the government action. See Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manlattai CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419.441 (1982).
24. In a lawsuit by a conservation organization making such a claim, the connection to
Keeble would be quite strong. In Keeble. the fact that the plaintiff had constructed a decoy to
capture the ducks and had earned money from the hunting appeared to be quite significant to the
court. See Keeble v. Hickeringill, 88 Eng. Rep. 945. 945 (Q.B. 1706). Similarly. an environmental
organization that invests in and manages land for its wildlife resources relies on the preservation
of the wildlife into the future to ensure the success of its efforts.
25. See 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 27 (1991).
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whether or not the defendant neighbor is aware that damage to wildlife will
result from his actions.26
III
There are two good reasons for environmentalists to explore using
property rights to defend the environment, rather than simply attempting to
justify expanded government intervention by restricting the scope of private
property rights.27
First, establishing stronger common-law property rights in
environmental resources such as wildlife and clean air or clean water might
help buttress government regulation against takings claims. The leading
case on takings challenges to environmental regulations is Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council.28 In Lucas, the Court held that a land-use
regulation that denies all economically valuable uses of a property
constitutes a per se taking of the property, requiring compensation. 9
However, the Court in Lucas recognized an exception to the new per se
takings rule for regulations that comported with the "background principles
of the State's law of property and nuisance ' 3 ' and the limits those
principles already placed on the use and ownership of private property. If
an action was already prohibited under the common law of nuisance in a
state, the property owner never had the right to undertake that action (for
example, the construction of a factory that pollutes the air) in the first place.
Thus, codification of that nuisance principle in a statute (through a
prohibition on the construction of polluting factories, even if that was the
only economically viable use of the property) could not be a taking.
Because the landowners never owned the property rights that are excluded
by nuisance law, the Court reasoned, the state may restrict those rights
without paying compensation.
26. See id. § 9.
27. The argument that takings jurisprudence could be used to expand private property rights
in order to protect the environment has been made by at least one other commentator, albeit in a
much narrower context. See Royal C. Gardner, Invoking Private Property Rights for
Environmental Purposes: The Taking Implications of Government-Authorized Aerial Pesticide
Spraying, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 65 (1999). Gardner argues that aerial pesticide spraying of
malathion to control Mediterranean fruit fly infestations could be seen as a temporary or
intermittent physical invasion of private property. See id. at 91-95. Gardner then proposes that
environmental groups and property owners affected by spraying join forces to sue for
compensation for the per se taking caused by the invasion. See id. at 95-102. He thus also
concludes that expansion of private property rights could benefit the environment. See id. at 98-
105. Gardner's argument is narrower than the one offered in this Case Note, however, as it is
restricted to the relatively specific fact pattern of aerial pesticide spraying, and does not advocate
the broader expansion of private property rights to include environmental amenities such as
wildlife, clean air, and clean water.
28. 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
29. See id. at 1019.
30. Id. at 1029.
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Seizing on this exception, several writers have argued that the nuisance
exception can include the "public trust" doctrine. Under this doctrine,
courts have held that certain interests in land or resources "such as
navigation and fishing" were "preserved for the benefit of the public in
perpetuity." 3 Even if the landowner had title to the property on which the
rights were located, the state could withdraw, alter, or regulate those rights
without taking the landowner's property. Some scholars have attempted to
expand this doctrine to include environmental goods such as wetlands32 and
endangered species,33 which they argue are held in "trust" for the benefit of
the public. These scholars have argued that the "background principles of
nuisance law" identified in Lucas must include these "public trust"
reservations of resources such as wetlands or endangered species. Because
these "public trust" rights must be reserved by the state for the public,
regulation of resources such as wetlands or endangered species cannot be
seen as taking any property rights of the landowners, and so no
compensation is owed under Lucas's "background principles" exception.
However, there are serious doubts about whether the "background
principles" exception in Lucas can so readily accommodate the public trust
doctrine as a justification for environmental regulation. The doctrine has
traditionally been restricted to navigable waters and those lands covered by
tidal flows,' not the upland habitats or freshwater wetlands that are the
subject of much environmental law. Moreover, Lucas arguably rejects this
type of broad interpretation of the public trust doctrine and state nuisance
law. After all, South Carolina had passed the law under review in Lucas in
order to preserve valuable beachfront habitat and to prevent the erosion of
barrier islands due to development. 5
But expanding common-law property rights to environmental resources
such as wildlife and clean water would help governments exploit the
"background principles of nuisance" exception of Lucas without relying on
31. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471,475 (1970).
32. See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, Has the U.S. Supreme Court Finally Drained the Swamp of
Takings Jurisprudence? The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on Wetlands and
Coastal Barrier Beaches, 19 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 1. 2-5 (1995): Paul Sarahan. Wetlands
Protection Post-Lucas: Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine on Takings Analysis. 13 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 537, 562-87 (1994).
33. See, e.g., Lynda Graham Cook, Lucas and Endangered Species Protection: When "Take'"
and "Takings" Collide, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185,211-17 (1993).
34. See Sarahan, supra note 32, at 559.
35. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022 (discussing the findings of the South Carolina legislature in
passing the act). The Court remanded the case to the lower court for a determination of whether
these rationales were within the "background principles" of nuisance, although it was very
skeptical that they would be. See id. at 1031. At least one commentator has interpreted Lucas as
rejecting "the economy of nature" vision of property, which holds that maintenance of land in its
natural state is as beneficial as development, or more so. See Joseph L. Sax. Propery Rights and
the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L.
REv. 1433, 1446 (1993).
2000]
The Yale Law Journal
the public trust doctrine. In establishing that the destruction of wildlife or
clean water resources enjoyed by property owners constitutes a physical
invasion, courts would limit landowners' rights to destroy those resources.
Governments could then point to such cases and argue that environmental
regulations protecting wetlands, endangered species, or water resources
merely codify these common-law property rights to wildlife and clean
water. Then, under Lucas's "background principles," the government may
regulate land use to protect those resources without effecting a taking.
Second, Lucas transfers the interpretation and future development of
property law from legislators to judges.36 Thus, if environmentalists seek to
use government regulation to prevent harms to ecological and
environmental goods, the proper route in the future may require expanding
property rights in the courts in cases like Kiesel, instead of passing statutes
in the legislature. Such a tool should not replace government regulation to
prevent environmental harms;37 statutory environmental law will still be an
essential part of the prevention of environmental harms. However, an active
effort to expand the definition of private property rights to include
environmental resources could be a valuable additional tool in the cause of
environmental protection.
Environmental activists should not necessarily see cases such as Kiesel
as a blow to environmental regulation. Environmentalists can and should
use takings and trespass law to expand private property rights to include
environmental amenities. This approach would provide both another sword
for environmental plaintiffs to use in court, and another shield for
environmental lawyers to defend government regulation against takings
claims.
-Eric Biber
36. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1068-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court's holding today
effectively freezes the State's common law, denying the legislature much of its traditional power
to revise the law governing the rights and uses of property."); see also John A. Humbach,
Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 COLJM. J. ENVTL. L. I. 23-28
(1993).
37. On this point, the argument of this Case Note differs significantly from those of other
commentators who have argued for the greater use of nuisance and takings law based on current
property rights (whether in land or water) to protect the environment. See, e.g., Terry L.
Anderson, Enviro-Capitalism vs. Enviro-Socialism, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, Winter 1995. at 35,
38 ("A return to more reliance on the private law of torts and contracts is crucial to the definition
and enforcement of property rights necessary for free market environmentalism."); Roger E.
Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Clean Water Legislation: Reauthorize or Repeal?, in TAKING THE
ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY 73, 75, 94-95 (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle eds., 1993) (calling
for the repeal of the Clean Water Act and its replacement with common-law nuisance causes of
action to prevent pollution). These commentators, often called "free market environmentalists,"
tend to be extremely hostile to government regulation and see the use of nuisance and takings law
as a replacement for, rather than a supplement to, the current statutory schemes. See generallv
TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991). In
contrast, this Case Note argues that the development of broader private property rights in
environmental amenities might help governments defend their environmental regulations against
takings claims.
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